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hris Vokes, commanding the
1st Canadian Infantry
Division's 2 Brigade in which the
Seaforth Highlanders served, had
heard about Major B.M.
Hoffmeister. "There is no such
thing as a bom soldier," Vokes
was told, "but he is the next best
thing to it. He takes to soldiering
like a duck to water." Vokes
wanted Hoffmeister to take over
the Seaforths, and he had
arranged it. 1 The regiment was
not in good shape when
Hoffmeister returned from the
Canadian Junior War Staff course
in Kingston, Ontario, in October
1942. Vokes told him it was now the worst
battalion of the three in the brigade, and he
wanted them to be the best. 2 There were
problems with some of the senior officers,
morale and discipline had slipped among the
rank and file and, Hoffmeister believed,
"damned bad leadership and administration"
were to blame. He stepped in, made changes in
personnel, began to send officers and NCOs on
courses, and stepped up the pace of training.
Morale improved dramatically, proving the
adage that troops who are worked hardest are
happiest. And his brigade and division
commanders thought highly of Hoffmeister.
Major-General Harry Salmon, the General
Officer Commanding (GOC), recommended him
for promotion (though ranking him fourth on a
list of four behind Foulkes, Vokes and Kitching),

C

citing his "ability to think clearly
and quickly. Good leadership
qualities. Will make a good G
staff [operations] officer and with
more experience a bde. comd. "3
Staff College had prepared
Hoffmeister for battle, and when
the 1st Division was detailed for
the operations in Sicily, Hoffy's
men, for so the Seaforths now
thought of themselves, were
ready.
Aboard ship en route to the
Mediterranean, the CO assured
that he went to each and every
platoon in the regiment to brief
them on the coming assault. As Hoffmeister
said, they were his friends- he used to row in
Vancouver with one of the sergeants, for
example. And while he knew other battalion
commanders didn't do this kind of all ranks'
briefing, he cherished the thought that the
men looked on him as a friend. Of course, that
would require him to stick his neck out in
action, to show himself, or else morale would
fall. But he was prepared for this because he
realized that unless he understood the
conditions the soldiers had to face, the
Seaforths' confidence in him could waver. A
man of powerful personality and striking
magnetism, Hoffmeister was the classic leader,
someone that men wanted to follow. In all
likelihood, they would have followed him if he
had not briefed them so well; taken into his
57
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were 30 casualties, but Hoffmeister escaped
unscathed, though severely shaken. 4 The next
month, Hoffmeister led his regiment in a
succession of attacks against Nazi positions
north of the Salsa River. The attack on the
enemy's 3rd Parachute Regiment north of
Carcaci on 5 August, staged in conjunction
with tanks of the Three Rivers Regiment. was
deemed "amodelinfantry-cum-tankaction"by
Major-General Guy Simonds, the GOC, who
watched the battle from a vantage point on a
nearby hilltop. So it was, for Hoffmeister rode
in the armoured regiment commander's tank
and thus kept control of the action. The paras
fought "to the last man and the last round,"
and the Seaforths in this one action lost 11
killed and 32 wounded. 5

Mqjor General B.M. Hoffmeister briefing officers ofthe
5th Canadian Armoured Division prior to the advance
on the Hitler Line, 13 May 1944.
(Photo by Strathy Smith/NAC PA 189922)

confidence, however, knowing his mind and
their place in the plans, the Seaforths were
ready for anything. There was nothing new in
this Hoffmeister approach, nothing innovative.
His was the classic technique of "man
management" as taught to officers, the approved
method of securing the "willing compliance"
necessary to make soldiers risk their lives;
unfortunately, it was all too often neglected by
less conscientious and less sensible officers.
The worth of Hoffmeister's approach was
shown in action. The Seaforths fought their
way through the rugged countryside with "fire,
movement and plenty of guts," taking casualties
but learning quickly and besting the Germans.
Hoffmeister himself narrowly escaped death
near Leonforte when four Canadian artillery
shells fell short and exploded near the spot he
was giving his orders on 21 July 1943. There

Hoffmeister and his regiment had proven
themselves in action. Simonds, however, was
not Hoffmeister's favourite commander, then
or later.
The GOC's concept of man
management was not Hoffmeister's. Simonds
was too cold-blooded. His orders were issued
in an abrupt manner, his plans being snapped
out, the session ending in a way that almost
forbade comment. Simonds offered few pats
on the back and, in Hoffmeister's view, made
no effort to see or understand the problems of
the battalion commander and his men. 6
And his initiation to battle in Sicily had
confirmed Hoffmeister in his view of Permanent
Force (PF) officers. They were often too old and
too fat and some drank too much, he said. The
PF "protective net" that surrounded them could
sometimes be hard to take. One brigadier, in
whom he had no confidence, would later be
forced upon him, the Canadian corps
commander telling Hoffmeister, by then a
division commander, that he was a PFer and
had to be given his chance. There was also
pressure to award decorations to PF senior
officers who, he believed, did not deserve them. 7
Hoffmeister merited his decorations, and
he won the first of his three DSOs in Sicily.
(There was an apocryphal story that his batman
was recommended for the Victoria Cross simply
for following Hoffmeister around!) It was not
long before he was promoted to brigadier. On
1 November 1943, the 1st Canadian Infantry
Division now fighting on the Italian mainland,

58

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol2/iss2/8

2

Granatstein: Hoffmeister in Italy

Vokes became a major-general and GOC in
place of Simonds who took the 5th Canadian
Armoured Division, then en route to Italy. To
replace Vokes, Hoffmeister got the nod. He had
been recommended by Simonds and General
Bernard Montgomery, the Eighth Army
commander, for a brigade command in
September and, though the initial intent back
at Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in
London was to give him a brigade in Britain,
the First Canadian Army's GOC-in-C, General
A.G.L. McNaughton, decided he should have 2
Brigade in 1st Division. 8
In fact, Hoffmeister was already an acting
brigadier, filling in for Vokes who had
temporarily replaced Simonds on 29 September
when the GOC was evacuated with jaundice.
Vokes had found Hoffmeister at a brigade
sports meet at Potenza and told him he was
promoted. Following the same philosophy he
had adopted more than two years before,
Hoffmeister simply said "that's fine, I'll tum
over [command of the Seaforths] immediately,
pack up my stuff and be at your headquarters
within an hour. "9
Hoffmeister's initiation during the rapid
advance of the division in the early days of the
campaign on the mainland was not without its
moments. His headquarters had lost touch
with one ofhis battalions, the Princess Patricia's
Canadian Light Infantry, and Hoffmeister and
another officer drove forward to find them. "I
couldn't see or hear a sound around any place.
... Suddenly I looked over my shoulder and
there was a German position up on a hill, an
O[bservation] P[ost] obviously manned by four
or five people. In those days," he went on, "I
carried a rifle and tried to look like a private
soldier," a sensible way of not being singled out
by the enemy. Then Hoffmeister spotted a line
of panzers, found some of his missing Patricias,
and used their wireless to call up his own
armour. Getting away soon turned into a
series of mad dashes as he and the other officer
took turns running and going to ground, chased
by tank gunfire. "I saw the Patricias the next
day," Hoffmeister's companion on this
adventure wrote later, "and heard how they sat
up on the hill and laughed at the spectacle of
the Brigade Commander . . . doing hundred
yard dashes between the shellbursts .... "10

If that affair had its slightly comic side, the
battle for Ortona around Christmas 1943 had
none. A small fishing port on the Adriatic
about halfway up the Italian peninsula, Ortona
had little strategic significance in and of itself,
but it was strongly held by the Germans and
the Canadians had been ordered to take the
town. To advance from the Mara River, 5 kms
south of Ortona, to the Riccio River, 4 kms
north of the town, took a month and cost
heavily in casualties- 253 officers and 3,703
men by the GOC's estimate at the time 11 - or
almost half the fighting strength of the Division's
infantry when the battle began in the second
week of December 1943.
For Hoffmeister's 2 Brigade, orders to take
Ortona were orders. In his recollection, as in
that of everyone who was there, it was "a
desperate struggle" even to reach the town, so
strongly were the rugged approaches defended;
then the battle in Ortona itself involved the
troops in house-to-house fighting as they
mouseholed their way from one connected
dwelling into the next. So vicious was the
battle that Vokes, alarmed at the decimation of
his infantry, asked Hoffmeister if he wanted to
quit. By this time, the Brigadier believed that
his troops were making progress against the
German paratroopers and said "absolutely not,
to quit at this time would be letting the brigade
down and the effect on the morale of the
brigade would be such that it would be just
shocking." 12 That may have been true, though
the impact of the slaughter at Ortona left the
bruised survivors reeling. Moreover, perhaps
Vokes' tactics were not appropriate, some
historians commenting that the division's
attacks faltered because they lacked weight,
often being launched by single battalions. The
terrain also could have lent itself to the
bypassing of the town, thus sparing
Hoffmeister's brigade much of the terrible
difficulty it experienced. "But Vokes, for all his
bluster," historian Brereton Greenhous
commented, "was never a man for daring or
momentum. Or for small leaps of logic. So he
sent his long-suffering 2 Brigade to take the
town." 13 Take it they eventually did after the
world press painted the fight as "Stalingrad in
Italy," the Nazis pulling out finally over the
night of 27-28 December.
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Hoffmeister's reward for the capture of
Ortona came in March 1944 when he was
promoted to major-general and given command
of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division which
had arrived in Italy before the new year and
had had both Simonds and General E.L.M.
Burns as its GOCs in the intervening month.
Hoffmeister had won the job on merit, but it
had not hurt that he was a militiaman. The
Defence Minister, Colonel J.L. Ralston, made
that clear when he wrote to Lieutenant -General
Ken Stuart at CMHQ:
Comparing Hoffmeister and [Brigadier T.G.] Gibson
both impressed me as excellent. Hoffmeister more
magnetic personality. IfHoffmeister reasonably equal
in tactical ability would think his personality and the
fact that he would give representation on divisional
level to the N.P.A.M. [Non-Permanent Active Militia]
might warrant giving him the call .... 14

Crerar, the Corps commander in Italy, and
Burns, his designated successor, agreed 15 and
so did the British. General Sir Oliver Leese,
commanding the Eighth Army, thought
"Brigadier Hochmeister" "excellent," "a grand
chap full of fight," a commander of"immense
drive" who "is turning out [to be] a very good
Armoured Divisional Commander." 16
Hoffmeister himself learned of his promotion
when Harry Crerar, who had summoned him
to meet him at a bridge, asked "How would you
like to command 5 Armoured?" "Very much.
When can I start?" "Well, you're a cool one,
aren't you?" 17 He was indeed, and his rise from
battalion to division commander without any
intervening period of staff employment was

Major General B.M. Hq[fmeister. GOC Fifth Armoured
Division, in Sherman Command tank "Vancouver."
After the battle of the Gothic Line, 31 Augu...-,;t 1944,
during which the Headquarters troop of the 9th Armoured Regiment (British Columbia Dragoons) was
wiped out. "Vancouver" was presented to the regiment by Hoffmeister. It was renamed "Dragoon II"
and was the command tank of the regiment until the
end of the war.
(CFPU 33253)

certainly unprecedented in the Canadian Army
in the Second World War.
The 5th Canadian Armoured Division had
only two brigades at this point, one armoured
and one infantry. Hoffmeister ran it just as he
had run his battalion and his brigade. He won
over his senior officers very quickly by, for
example, telling Brigadier J. Desmond B. Smith,
the commander of the 5th Canadian Armoured
Brigade, that he knew "bugger all" about
handling armour and asking for his help. 18
With the troops, he exerted his personality and
showed himself. The 11th Canadian Infantry
Brigade, his other brigade, had suffered a
bloody repulse in a daylight attack on the Arieli
River in January, and the troops still had not
recovered their morale. The new GOC visited
each unit, inspected their quarters, and
demanded improvements where necessary. He
made it clear to the officers that their
responsibilities included looking after their
men, and morale began to rise. It literally
soared after Hoffmeister organized divisional
exercises to demonstrate the tremendous array
of weaponry that the division had. "The punch,
the clout this division had was just
tremendous," he said, "and no person, private
soldier, NCO, or officer could fail to be impressed
by this." His exercises including teaching the
infantry how to advance behind artillery fire
Hoffmeister personally took every infantry
company in turn to show them how to lean into
the barrage. This was always a calculated risk,
and when the inevitable round fell short on one
such demonstration, he remembered the
infantrymen looking at him: "What do you say
now, wise guy?" 19
But one of his battalions, the Perth
Regiment, a unit that had been hard-hit on the
Arieli, was not responding and seemed so
sullen and unresponsive as to be close to
mutiny. Neither the brigade commander nor
the battalion commander could suggest how to
deal with the difiiculty so Hoffmeister arranged
for two men from each platoon to meet with
him with no other officers or NCOs present.
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... I explained to the men exactly what the problem
was, and the danger of going into battle with this lack
of confidence and the poor morale that existed ...
and (said] that we were going to stay there until I had
answers. I said "I don't have the names of any of you
men and I don't want to know your names; nothing
you say here is being recorded, this is for my
information ... only, so that I in turn may take the
necessary action to get this unit in shape to fight." So
we sat there and looked at each other, not a word was
said and this went on, it seemed, like a long time ...
. Finally a bit of dialogue started to develop and we
worked this around by question and answer to the
point where four officers were named as having
performed badly in the Arieli thing ... [and] the men
had absolutely no confidence in them and were
reluctant to go into battle with them. This was the
reason for the low morale. . . . I dismissed the
meeting. went back to my HQ, called in the brigade
commander and battalion commander and ordered
him to dispose of these officers to the holding unit
forthwith. 20

This was not the usual general's way of dealing
with unit morale, but it worked, and the Perths
became a very good fighting regiment.
How was it that Hoffmeister knew how to
deal with such problems? Part of the answer
was instinctive in the man, a simple sense of
understanding how soldiers thought and
reacted and how they wanted their officers to
treat them. But it was also that only six
months earlier he had been commanding a rifle
battalion in action, and hence he understood
what one could and could not do. As a brigadier
and as a major-general, however, he knew that
he could no longer influence events on the
battlefield by seizing a rifle and joining the fray.
Now as a GOC he had to stand back and find
different ways to motivate soldiers, battalions,
and staffs. To his credit, he found the ways,
and he was one of the very few senior officers
in the Canadian army who thought seriously
and systematically about such problems, one
of the few who did not simply rely on the
authority conveyed by his rank to get his way.
Hoffmeister led as well as commanded. 21
The beginnings of Hoffmeister's impact on
his division became apparent in its first major
action. When II Canadian Corps attacked the
Hitler Line in the Liri Valley on May 23, the plan
called for the 5th Armoured, now beginning to
think of itself as "Hoffy's Mighty Maroon

Machine," after its coloured divisional arm
patch, to pour through a gap in the line opened
by the 1st Canadian Division. The plan worked
well, though not without heavy fighting,
casualties, and delays, and the armoured
division drove through the hard-won breach
with great panache.
For Hoffmeister's
headquarters staff, the only problem caused
by their GOC was his habit of going forward too
far and too often. Useful as that could be and
necessary as it was for Hoffmeister to see what
opposition he was sending his men to meet, it
put him out of touch and left the staff to fight
the battle. That caused difficulties. 22 There
were worse ones. Unfortunately, the Eighth
Army's planners had clogged the limited road
network in the valley with too much traffic and
horrendous jams resulted that slowed the
pursuit as the Nazis retreated toward the north.
General Burns, the Canadian corps
commander, received the blame, and there
was a natural tendency to look elsewhere for
scapegoats. Hoffmeister's division took its
share of the rap, his headquarters making the
Corps staff very angry: "It is a hopeless task to
try and get anything out of HQ 5 Cdn Div,"
Brigadier Nick McCarter, the BGS (Brigadier,
General Staff), wrote in his personal diary.
"They are behaving like complete amateurs."
Worse, the division was using routes designated
for other units. 23 Then, the commander of 11th
Brigade, T.E.D'O. Snow, a PF officer, had to be
pushed to exercise command of his troops in
action, something that angered and disturbed
Hoffmeister. For his part Snow, who was
replaced in the next month, also wrote very
critically ofthe division headquarters' conduct
of the operation. 24 The problems aside, the 5th
Armoured had performed well in its first major
operation, 25 and Hoffmeister too had learned
much. Certainly Burns was pleased. As he
wrote privately, "Bert Hoffmeister did an
excellent job and fought his green division with
all the drive we expected of him." 26
Hoffmeister's 5th Armoured fought its next
major battle on the Nazis' Gothic Line that
protected northern Italy and the Po Valley. The
Canadian Corps was to attack the Adriatic
hinge of the line, and the date for a massive setpiece attack was fixed for the night of 1-2
September 1944. But initial patrol reports on
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the night of 29-30 August suggested
a strange lack of German activity,
and the Corps headquarters decided
to move against the enemy on 30
August. Hoffmeister's division now
had been strengthened with an
additional brigade of infantry, and
his battalions once more struggled to
open a hole in the line for the tanks.
Although the reports were confused
and confusing, Hoffmeister made the
"gutsy decision" to commit his
armoured brigade at onceP By this
time his staffs work was first-rate,
Hoffmeister sought advice and took
it, and the change in the meticulouslyprepared plan was implemented
without difficulty. 28 After fierce
fighting, the Germans, one division in
danger of encirclement, began to pull
back on September l. There was
much more fighting before the line
was cleared, but Hoffmeister's
courageous seizure of the initiative
had helped greatly to win the battle.
Oliver Leese fairly bubbled when he Canadian soldiers examine a map of the Italian Peninsula. (NAC)
told Montgomery that "The troops
fought very well, especially the 5th Cdn Armd
Div. This Div, led by Bert Hoffmeister, has the
terrific dash of 7th Armd [the British Army's
famous Desert Rats] in the old days. They have
really done extremelywell." 29 More concretely,
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